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Abstract: The complications of the Syrian crisis that has extended over six years are overseen on three distinct levels which are 
national, topographical, and global. A closer look at the situation in Syria in 2010/2011 will help explain why the regime has 
survived, the complexities of the situation in Syria, and what makes the search for a stable political settlement so difficult. The 
purpose of the present study is to highlight the nature of US engagement in the Syrian crisis which involves maintaining the US 
military presence for regional stability, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, countering the future expansion of the Iranian 
influence and political settlement to the conflict, containing the Assad‟s regime in the interim. By outlining various threats, issues, 
assessing the Syrian conflict and its key actors, this paper seeks to explain the US response to the Syrian crisis on basis of 
thematic analysis. In conclusion, the United States' foreign policy has continued in a region vital to its national security interests 
due to available oil, its impetus to protect Israel, to support security by retaining military bases, to preserve the position of the 
protectorate of client states, and friendly regimes, and to resist Islamic movements and terrorism.     
  





Syria has seen anti-government demonstrations erupt. Similar protests in the 
Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring-inspired these demonstrations. The Assad 
regime reacted violently to the peaceful demonstrations, exacerbating the situation. He 
used the security and intelligence services to disperse rallies and marches, often with live 
fire, and to apprehend dissidents (Khan and Khan 2017). Despite expectations, the Syrian 
system has withstood tireless pressing factors and surge from abroad for almost five 
years. A closer look at the situation in Syria in 2010/2011 will help explain why the 
regime has survived, the complexities of the situation in Syria, and what makes a stable 
political settlement so difficult (Ottaway 2015). Figure 1 shows that the areas of 
influence under Syrian opposition forces were significantly decreased between the years 
2017 and 2020. 
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Figure 1: Areas of Influence or Presence (Source: Humud, Blanchard and Nikitin 2016) 
 
The complication of the Syrian emergency that has extended over six years 
doesn't appear to be resolute at that present time or near future. It was overseen on 






The Syrian civil conflict started in March 2011 in the southern city of Dera'a, 
roused by the Arab Spring which started a couple of months sooner in Tunisia and had 
shaken the establishment of a few Bedouin systems. The emergency could presumably 
have been contained had Bashar al-Assad and his lieutenants reacted gently and 
astutely to the underlying exhibits. All things being equal, they decided to subdue the 
dissent ruthlessly also, set off a steadily extending pattern of brutality that very soon 
turned into an undeniable common conflict. At the center of that war are various 
complaints against a bad and tyrannical system, generally significant of which is the 
Arab Sunni dominant part's refusal to acknowledge Alawite authority.  
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The Alawites establish 12 percent of the province's populace and as a branch of 




Iran partakes straightforwardly in the common conflict and has utilized its 
Lebanese intermediary, Hezbollah, as a primary battling power as Bashar al-Assad's 
military has deteriorated in the course of the last not many a long time. Iran has 
additionally dispatched Syria Shiite warriors from Iraq and Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia 
doesn't take an interest straightforwardly in the battling however like different Sunni 
states it upholds a few resistance bunches with cash and weapons. Iran has extremely 
high stakes in the Syrian emergency. Under Bashar al-Assad, the Iranian-Syrian 
relationship has been changed from organization and partnership to reliance. As the 
Syrian common conflict heightened and the risk to the system's presence has 
developed, Iran had to expand its interest in Syria. It couldn't examine the possibility of 
losing its Syrian base, let alone of Syria going under Western or traditionalist Bedouin 
impact. On schedule, Iran and its intermediaries have assumed control over a huge part 




With the flare-up of the common conflict in Syria, Russia's help for Bashar al-
Assad was discretionary. With China's assistance, it obstructed all moves in the Security 
Council coordinated against the system and its monstrosities. In the fall of 2015, Putin 
pushed ahead by choosing to mediate militarily in request to save al-Assad from military 
loss and dispatch its flying corps and air protection frameworks to northern Syria (Liff 
and Ikenberry 2014).  
The Obama administration made plans to stay away from the „no-fly zone‟ and 
different types of political associations in Syria. In 2011, the greater part of President 
Obama's senior helpers upheld the production of „no-fly zone‟ or „safe zones‟ and 
different types of inclusion, yet the president ruled against it (Manyin et al. 2012). The 
Syrian common conflict has also exacerbated the crisis presented to Europe by rushes of 
displaced people from African and Middle Eastern nations (Byman and Speakman 2016). 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The objectives of the present study are to provide a thematic analysis of US 
engagement in the Syrian crisis. The nature of US involvement and influence in Syrian 
conflicts is categorically divided into features like involves maintaining the US military 
presence for regional stability, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, countering the 
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future expansion of the Iranian influence and political settlement to the conflict, 
containing the al-Assad regime in the interim. 
 
THE NATURE OF US ENGAGEMENT IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
 
Maintaining US Military Presence in Regional Stability 
 
The US is profoundly associated with wars that must be succeeded at the 
common military level, and where understanding the profound inside divisions and 
strains of the host country, and the pressing factors from outside states, are basic. Up 
until now, the United States has neglected to perceive the sheer size of the common 
issues it faces in leading military activities. It has neglected to comprehend the 
requirements to complete unrest in common military issues if it is to be fruitful in 
battling fizzled state wars that include significant counterinsurgency missions and 
dependence on have country powers. The US military job in Syria is a key for example, 
and it outlines plainly that any military exertion to try not to manage the full outcomes 
of the common side of a war can be a formula for disappointment (Cordesman 2017). In 
August 2013, as al-Assad‟s forces were defending, they used chemical weapons in al-
Ghouta, a Damascus suburb (Aboultaif 2016). The West's inability to react quickly to al-
Assad‟s use of synthetic weapons aided the harsh repression of protestors (Eckert 2020). 
This occurred a few days after Obama's announcement that al-Assad would cross a red 
line if chemical weapons were used (Kfir 2016). 
After US and UN investigators confirmed Syrian gas use, president Obama 
considered a military strike to act as a deterrent and a roadblock to Assad's use of 
chemical weapons (Kaphle 2014). Obama went to Congress to seek approval for a 
military strike. Before the vote, Russia negotiated a deal that allowed Syria to hand over 
its chemical weapons. On 21 September 2013, Syria agreed to its demands and handed 
over information about its chemical weapons to the UN, effectively putting an end to 
the threat of Western attacks (Escritt 2013). As indicated by certain examiners, the US 
international interests in the Middle East are to control the production and exchange of 
oil and gas items around there and to guarantee the assurance of ethnic and strict 
confinement Israel around there. That is the reason the US doesn't need an entire Syria 
that represents a danger to Israel's security. Since 2012, military and monetary help have 
been given to a few resistance powers around there. In 2016, the US set up an army 
installation in al-Tanf, close to the Iraq and Jordan line. At this base, the assailants of 
„Megavir al-Tavra‟ were prepared by the US military. In 2012, the Kurdish People's 
Defense Unity (KPDU), a neighborhood Kurdish gathering in Syria, which has developed 
altogether with the assistance of the United States, has assumed responsibility for the 
northeastern pieces of the country.  
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The United States has detailed that they have been furnished Kurds against ISIS 
warriors in Syria (Oner, Durmaz-Drinkwater, and Grant 2020). For a long time, the US 
and its allies have been fighting the Islamic State in northwest Syria, attempting to cut 
off the group's access to the Turkish border and advance toward Raqqah, the group's 
proclaimed capital. Islamic State power over the purported „Manbij Pocket‟ the territory 
limited by Azaz in the west, the Turkish boundary in the north, al-Bab toward the south, 
and the Euphrates stream toward the east (Figure 2) filled in as the excess association 
point for the Islamic State to the rest of the world and gave a key stockpile and 
unfamiliar contender travel course (Erlich and Chomsky 2014). 
On 17 September 2016, US military officials announced that they had halted a 
strike in eastern Syria after learning from Russia that the vehicles and personnel 
targeted were potentially vital to the Syrian military. According to Syrian and Russian 
officials, Syrian soldiers were killed and another 100 were injured in the attacks. Russia 
convened a Security Council crisis meeting to discuss the incident, which is the first time 
that US forces have been linked to the Syrian military since the country's dynamic 
activities began in September 2014 (Fischer 2014). However, despite their usefulness, 
these findings do not provide insight into how the fate of Syria's renowned US allies, the 
Syrian Kurds, could be simplified when enforcing the current foreign policy that aims to 
avoid direct military interference. It's also worth noting that the preceding findings 
contribute to an interpretation of possible reasons for the United States' withdrawal 
from Syria, however, fails to uncover any of the incidents that could have contributed to 
the country's previous ignorance of the crisis (Phillips 2016). 
Psychological injustice and revolutionary fanaticism are both dangerous. 
Regardless of ISIS' defeat, psychological warfare also has a long way to go. Under the 
guise of jihad, revolutionary revolutionaries train warriors. The brain science of 
radicalism can be traced back to the Gulf War when most Middle Eastern countries were 
enraged by the US's successful contribution. Jihadism resurfaced to save the Muslim 
world from Western invaders. From one point of view, an individual's, a family's, and a 
state's vulnerability led to a decision based on unconstitutional coercion and fanaticism. 
On the other hand, the unsteady world of politics provides fertile ground for 
psychological oppression to develop. Revolutionary fanatics and oppressors motivated 
by fear are then ready to use religion as a political tool to achieve their goals. They have 
killed and wounded a large number of ordinary people and US troopers (Rasheed 2021).  
 
Ensure the Enduring Defeat of ISIS 
 
The emergence of ISIS and the active position of Kurdish power has influenced 
the depth of the US goal and dedication to maintaining the state structure in the region 
as defined by physical borders drawn a century ago. Although the US has long been 
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concerned about the Arab Gulf states „chequebook diplomacy‟,1 it is only now that these 
states are using military force on their own, even in ways that are uncoordinated with 
their conventional security guarantor (Mueller et al. 2017). According to estimates, the 
so-called Islamic State has lost roughly 45 percent of its territory in Iraq and 10% in Syria 
(Kozaric 2017). Such major increases in military missions, in particular, are critical in 
reducing ISIS' ability to exercise complete control over its membership base, as well as 
its ability to finance itself unrestrictedly through the sale of oil, objects, slaves, and the 
burdening and coercion of money-related installments from its daily citizen population 
(Speckhard and Yayla 2016). Recently, US authorities have announced a significant 
decrease in the number of foreign warriors traveling to Iraq and Syria from 2000 to 500 
per month, with some estimates falling as low as 200 (Kozaric 2017). 
For more than 50 years, the United States has had a political, economic, and 
military relationship with the Central East (Altunısık 2013). Despite the public's fatigue 
with the dispute and growing support for a fantastic restriction strategy, direct US 
involvement in the district will continue in the foreseeable future. Regardless of the 
difficulties in recognizing (not to mention seeking after and accomplishing), the United 
States has numerous center interests in the Middle East, including the 'least bad option' 
in the Syrian popular conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the unwelcome tension 
between promoting democratization and power. These include preventing the rise of a 
local hegemon, nuclear expansion, and large-scale terrorist attacks on the region, as well 
as ensuring access to oil and the safety of provincial partners (Altunışık 2013). 
These vested interests serve as a backdrop to the most serious regional threat to 
emerge in recent years: ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Fortunately, ISIS poses 
little threat to the United States' most vital territorial interests, such as preventing the 
rise of a provincial hegemon and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The bad news is 
that ISIS poses a significant threat to some other US interests, including the stability of 
local allies and the prevention of psychological militant attacks (Nance 2016). 
Intelligence analysts came to know that ISIS has three faces, but somehow ISIS is at the 
same time is a rebel group, a state government, and an innovator association. 
Understanding and beating any one of these individuals is thought-provoking; 
efficiently addressing all three at once is almost dreadful given the tensions in main 
concern and strategies among them. The task turns out to be much more troublesome 
given that the US is far superior positioned to overcome a few parts of ISIS than others. 
The underestimation of ISIS will in this way require a multilateral, multi-stage exertion 
across various fronts: a conflict of bombs, a conflict of administration, what's more, a 
conflict of thoughts. I offer a progression of strategy suggestions for how these three 
isolated battles can be sought after in reciprocal style, instead of in detachment or 
                                                          
1
 „Chequebook diplomacy‟ is a foreign policy which openly uses economic aid and investment between countries in 
bilateral relationships order to carry out diplomatic favors. 
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inconsistency (Hüppi et al. 2016). Overcoming ISIS as a state necessitates something 
more than simply removing them from the control of the country. To ensure that the 
„Islamic State‟ does not return and is not welcomed by people in the pounded provinces, 
competitive authority must be involved and won. Local governments must meet 
residents' basic needs, such as safety and transportation, as well as necessities such as 
employment, health care, and schools. The most important thing is that they should 
make civilians feel secure in this country, regardless of whether they are a minority 
ethnic or religious group. If governments fail to offer basic rights and need to citizens, 
affected people will become more vulnerable to extremist groups like ISIS, which 
promises safe streets, free schools, and an end to fraud in exchange for increased 
restrictions on liberty (Krause 2018). 
In any case, the US can and should set the tone by offering political, financial, and 
military assistance to help authorize power-sharing arrangements both within and 
between Middle Eastern countries. The most significant obstacles to quality, systemic 
administration in the region are fights between gatherings and states over the 
circulation of assets and power. The US should provide momentum and international 
pressure to help territorial states enter and develop agreements that ensure that all 
ethnic and religious networks have a seat at the table and a stake in the region. They 
can also collaborate with key allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, as well as key 
adversaries like Russia and Iran, to develop concrete concessions to handle global 
knowledge exchange and authoritative reaches. Conflicts and conflicts will continue, but 
the costs of endless intermediary wars that do little but strengthen a widespread threat 
like ISIS should encourage these interactions to move toward a more secure territorial 
appeal (Silverstone 2018). 
ISIS can be defeated, but only with strong provincial alliances and if the war isn't 
entwined with larger initiatives of foreign-imposed regime change and democratization, 
which have had a bleak history and a bleak future. The secret to defeating ISIS is to 
recognize and recognize its three faces, as well as to exploit the vulnerabilities that such 
a dynamic organization poses (Blumenthal 2020). 
 
Counter the Future Expansion of Iranian Influence 
 
Iran has been able to formalize and expand Shi'a unfamiliar warrior organizations 
all over the region as a result of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Shi'a assailants from Syria, 
Lebanon, and Iraq are transforming into a „Hezbollah-style‟ organization loyal to Iran 
and ready to fight alongside Iranian soldiers and guides. The Afghan and Pakistani 
Khomeinist networks were then converted to include a large number of candidates for 
use as stun troops in war zones spanning the Middle East and South Asia (Daraghi 
2017). The Obama administration's Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) paper, titled 
'Methodology for Approving Direct Action outside the United States and Spaces of 
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Active Hostilities', outlined a plan for strikes outside of spaces of complex challenges, 
which include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and a few Libyan spaces for short periods. Jones 
(2017), described the White House Deputies Committee meetings were crucial for 
obtaining approval for such assaults regularly.  
In either case, groups like ISIS have become increasingly decentralized and 
adaptable, requiring the US to be equally efficient and adaptable. The fall of oil costs 
from mid-June 2014 (60% tumble from the pinnacle cost) contrarily influenced the 
Iranian oil industry (Farzanegan and Parvari 2014). The low costs couldn't make it 
workable for the nation to profit from the extension of oil sends out after the atomic 
understanding, however much the benefit would have been under before conditions. 
Saudi Arabia, the philosophical and international adversary of Iran, applies a huge 
impact on the cost of oil and the lasting low-value level serves the interest of the 
Kingdom against Tehran (Farzanegan and Parvari 2014). Without tremendous fare 
earnings, it makes the homegrown capital amassing unthinkable, along these lines 
hindering the recuperation of the Iranian hydrocarbon area) Because in the post-
sanctions era the Iranian government has not delivered the expected high economic 
results yet (Davig et al. 2015). The leadership has been facing criticism from the 
proponents of the political and economic isolation of Iran. 
To resolve the existing shortcomings and potential dangers in the Iranian 
hydrocarbon sector, the Iranian government must make improvements to the 
infrastructural foundation and institutional foundation of oil and gas companies, as well 
as address the global impact on these critical areas. When in doubt, Iran should take 
advantage of its current qualities and anticipated freedoms to fully solve domestic and 
global oil and gas problems (Dudlák 2018). 
Iran appears to be making strides toward greater energy success. Somehow 
recently, there is a reasonable shift from the philosophical contemplations to a more 
sober-minded methodology in the administration of the Iranian economy and the 
essential assets. Under these conditions, building trust is fundamental, however, it is a 
more extended interaction by its temperament. This suffering change in Iran may be a 
great feature of how a shut economy wealthy in hydrocarbon assets can change its 
philosophical also, political design bit by bit from the inside. Outside influences, in 
addition to internal practices, continue to play a significant role in this period of 
transition, and in this context, the global community's responsibility to support Iran's 
reformist plan is crucial. In light of everything, it merits keeping just the lower 
assumptions concerning the impending creation blast of the Iranian hydrocarbon 
industry has suffered. Because of external market proclivities (low oil value, oversupply 
on the horizon) and inward reallocation of monetary capital. Practically speaking, it 
implies that both the augmentation of fare limit and the contribution of worldwide 
organizations will happen in a continuous, managed way, wherein every one of the 
interests of significant Iranian political and monetary partners will be thought of among 
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the invested individuals, the most plausible situation proposes a sluggish and ceaseless 
change in the Islamic Republic's oil and gas industries (Dudlák 2018). 
 
Political Settlement of the Conflict in the Assad‟s Regime 
 
Syria's civil war is now in its seventh year, with a wide range of public and 
international events. Critically, no group is in a position to take control of the entire 
world. This document contains recommendations for efforts at stabilization. There is a 
growing recognition that the Assad regime cannot be overthrown and that efforts to 
find a diplomatic solution should take this into account. The focus has shifted to 
methods for reducing conflict and planning for reform talks (Heydemann 2020). 
The Syrian dispute is a multi-layered one involving multiple entertainers, rather 
than a war between two gatherings. There are threats between various Syrian resistance 
gatherings (eminently conservatives and radicals), with the Kurds, with Islamic State, and 
between fanatic gatherings (ISIL just as there is a „key‟ struggle between the al-Assad 
regime and Syrian resistance gatherings, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State, between 
fanatic groups (including ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra), and an intermediary fight between 
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, which support the al-Assad regime, and the West, which 
sponsors' moderate resistance groups. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
and Turkey are also included, supporting various Syrian resistance groups, including 
fanatic gatherings – the first two nations are primarily moving fanatic gatherings in the 
south, while the third and fourth nations are primarily moving fanatic gatherings in the 
north (Pawlak 2017). 
Iran is adamant about preserving the regime, fearing that al-Assad‟s removal 
would lead to parallel efforts in Iran to destabilize the Islamic Republic (Jenkins 2013; 
Kodmani 2015). Iran would also lose a major ally in the area. Iran has pressed Hezbollah 
to assist Syria's army, much as it has gathered Shi'a volunteers in Iraq and Lebanon. 
The West is reluctant to provide generous military assistance to opposition 
groups for fear of Assad being replaced by a radical Islamist government and advanced 
weapons falling into the hands of radical groups and being used to attack the West 
(Jenkins 2013; Kodmani 2015). The dispute has disintegrated government institutions, 
including the nation's outfitted powers, which have been replaced by a web of 
increasingly self-governing neighborhood elements. A majority of the volunteer forces 
fighting to protect the regime are not under direct government supervision (Jenkins 
2013). This has implications for any potential settlement, as there are several 
independent military and criminal gatherings, regardless of whether the military is killed.  
The EU made remarks like “President Assad must step aside to allow a political 
transition to take place in Syria” from August 18th to the end of 2012 (Turkmani and 
Haid, 2016). As a result, for Russia, the tradeoffs associated with power-sharing are 
distinct from those associated with the power distribution regime of Bashar al-Assad.  
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The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2254 on 18 December 
2015, which alludes to a temporary administering body but also calls for “sound, 
inclusive, and nonsectarian administration”, the drafting of a new constitution, and UN-
managed decisions. The UN is secretly de-emphasizing aggressive conflicts about how 
to decode temporary language acquired in 2012 by shifting focus to coincidental 
political courses of action, thus opening the possibility of a peaceful relationship that 
allows al-Assad to stay in power (Lund 2017). 
There are huge schisms over the al-Assad regime, with some (such as the Syrian 
opposition, the US, the EU, and most Arab states) demanding his removal and others 
(such as Iran and Russia) finding the structure to be equally essential. So far, finding a 
reasonable middle ground on al-Assad‟s future has proven difficult. There appears to be 
growing recognition, based on rationality, of the al-Assad regime's continued presence 
among global partners. Nonetheless, as Kodmani points out, “there is a difference 
between maintaining Assad and his system as is, and maintaining Assad and his system 
as is, on the one side, and keeping Assad in control for a limited time before his flight 
can be booked as part of a pre-planned popularity-driven loop based on sacred 
components, on the other” (Ibrahim 2017). 
It was determined that al-Assad could not consolidate his authority over the 
entire country, and given the disparities in positions of anti- and pro-government forces 
on a variety of issues, it is unclear if Syria can be safeguarded in its current form. Future 
efforts at post-conflict reconstruction in Syria may be based on the simple assumption 
that „Syria‟ no longer has a political substance that can be resurrected in any meaningful 
form (Tuck 2016). Whatever the case may be, the disintegration or secession of Syria 
poses a significant threat to the Middle East's overall power. The agreement could now 
include maintaining Syria's current structure along with significant political and 
monetary decentralization, as well as a special status for Kurdish areas (however this last 




The economic and political presence of the United States in the Middle East 
constituency before, during, and after World War I and World War II aids in 
understanding how the United States developed itself in the region and what its goals 
were following its manifestation. The current article also emphasizes the US critical 
interests in the Middle East, including ensuring deliberate access to oil in the Gulf 
region, promoting and defending Israel's supremacy, maintaining US military bases, 
securing client-states and supportive regimes, and combating Islamic movements, and 
terrorist organizations. The synthesis of research based on this literature review shows 
that the United States foreign policy has continued in a region vital to its national 
security interests due to available oil, its impetus to protect Israel, to support security by 
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retaining military bases, to preserve the position of the protectorate of client states and 
friendly regimes, and to resist Islamic movements and terrorism. These five forces have 
pushed US decision-makers to take control of the area, and they continue to be 
essential to the US today.  
Students and scholars of international affairs need to consider the history of the 
Middle East importance, as well as insight into the motivations and desires of American 
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